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Paper Abstract
EUCOM and NATO commanders today face a new threat in Eastern Europe in the form of Russian hybrid warfare, as recently seen in Crimea and the Ukraine. As EUCOM and NATO planners develop operational contingency plans for hybrid warfare in this theater, the tenets of counterinsurgency provide a logical framework for a successful operational design. This paper examines how commanders and their staffs can utilize battle proven COIN design tenets to counter the current Russian ideas of hybrid warfare. This paper also delves into the efficacy of Article V of the NATO charter and how it will affect the NATO timeline for response should Russia instigate hybrid war in the Baltics.
Over the course of the last decade, conflict in the EUCOM theater has shifted toward non-lethal forms of aggression that are being used in combination with traditional lethal military force, a combination that is increasingly labeled hybrid warfare. U.S. and NATO commanders today face a very real and significant threat that does not have a well established doctrinal response. Although hybrid warfare is not necessarily a form of insurgency, if EUCOM and NATO commanders act while the conflict is still in its non-lethal stages, they can effectively use the tools developed for counterinsurgency (COIN) to respond to early stage hybrid warfare, which may span the spectrum of non-lethal means from strategic communications, propaganda, cyber attack and engineered social unrest to special forces operations and the use of unmanned drones. For these responses to be effective, it is important that commanders recognize early stage hybrid warfare, and respond proportionately and appropriately before the conflict develops into a more traditional armed conflict. This is especially true in response to Russia's new methods of armed conflict, tested and refined in Georgia, Crimea and the Ukraine -a form of hybrid warfare that is causing concern to Eastern European NATO states who are unsure if western powers will be willing to act in collective defense to non-traditional forms of attack.
If Russia continues this pattern of aggression, EUCOM and NATO commanders can expect to see it reprised in the Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, all relatively recent additions to NATO that in the past fell within the Russian sphere of influence. In Russia's recent incursions into Crimea and the Ukraine, one of the primary factors that President Putin used to both enable and justify Russian aggression was the presence of a large ethnic Russian minority that he asserted were being repressed. Looking at NATO member nations in the Baltics, it is easy to see parallels in every country, as they all have sizable Russian minorities, but most notably the Estonian county of Ida-Viru, centered around the city of Narva, where ethnic Russians make up 70% of the population. 1 As IdaViru shares a border with Russia, this north-east corner of Estonia is ripe for conflict and would be a logical bridge into the Baltics. Looking at this area of Estonia (and equally as strategically important and exploitable, the south-eastern provinces of Latvia with their high population density of ethnic Russians) can help NATO planners create specific, detailed plans for the next stage of hybrid warfare in Eastern Europe.
As EUCOM and NATO planners develop the operational design for defense of the Baltics against Russian aggression, utilization of the tenets of COIN can provide a basic foundation for the concept of operations. Planners should emphasize understanding the operational environment and the peculiarities of Russia's brand of hybrid warfare, using COIN principles to counter this system of aggression and understand the importance of taking decisive action at the right time to blunt the attack before it develops into a conventional armed conflict.
Understanding the Operational Environment
The first tenet of COIN is understanding the operational environment, and this is a rational starting point to counter a hybrid warfare threat. A fundamental understanding of the root causes of unrest in Eastern Europe along with a firm understanding of Russian motivations in the region are essential for NATO planners to properly respond to aggression. can lend legitimacy to a government that may be struggling to connect with ethnic subdivisions of the population. Working with partner nation militaries in humanitarian missions and community outreach programs also has the benefit of putting a human face on allied militaries, creating lasting positive impressions of NATO and western countries.
Throughout the hybrid warfare campaign, the third tenet of counterinsurgency, the primacy of politics, must be at the forefront of all U.S. and NATO plans. For EUCOM and NATO planners, deterrence operations will likely make up the bulk of political primacy at the operational level.
Large scale, multinational deterrence operations like Operation ATLANTIC RESOLVE 2015 are an excellent example of deterrence operations, however NATO commanders need to ensure that after the large exercise is complete, they continue to apply steady deterrent pressure to Russia. 22 Charles Doran and Jakub Grygiel note, "Deploying a few troops hints at intent but placing heavier capability on the ground and offshore conveys genuine determination. Only the latter can strengthen the deterrent that NATO, and the U.S.
in particular, have extended to its most exposed members on the eastern frontier." 23 As much as the specific capability employed is important, it is equally as important to maintain a constant, unremitting presence with that force.
U.S. and NATO deterrence operations must be ever-present and specifically tailored to deter early stage Russian hybrid warfare aggression. Although large military exercises have an excellent military deterrent effect, as previously noted, Russia is intentionally operating below the threshold of where they believe Western powers might react militarily.
An outright conventional attack on the Baltic states is highly unlikely in large part due to Western deterrence, but cyber attack, propaganda, information warfare, and civil unrest are all tools at Russia's disposal that they will not hesitate to use unless NATO can field a credible deterrence. NATO commanders must tailor deterrence operations toward discouraging phase one non-military actions by Russia in these countries.
In a great first step forward down this path, NATO Secretary General Jens
Stoltenberg recently announced that NATO will consider "that a cyber-attack can also trigger collected defense, article five response… a cyber-attack can be as serious as a more conventional attack." 24 In this same vein, NATO commanders need to make clear that they understand hybrid warfare and will act in retaliation against other non-lethal, non-military forms of attack against allies just like they would cyber attack.
Just as important as deterring Russian aggression, it is important that NATO countries provide a strong deterrent for the civil population, especially if unrest begins to develop. It is essential that the minority population be convinced that if they rise up against their government, they would also face the military forces of western allies. It is one thing to stand up to domestic military forces that may seem weak or inept because of propaganda and political failings of the country, but quite another to stand up to modern, battle hardened NATO forces. There is a delicate balance that must be struck of maintaining a believable deterrent posture, but at the same time, ensuring that those same western military components do not threaten, intimidate or radicalize alienated portions of the population.
Convincing the minority population that any uprising would be countered by American and NATO forces, working closely with the host nation's armed forces, would be the most effective deterrence against Russian hybrid warfare.
Through this process, we can expect Russian forces to advance to their phase two methods of political and military deception. These efforts would be designed specifically to 24 Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Joint Press Conference, March 25, 2015.
challenge western political will and force NATO forces to provide Russian and insurgent forces the space they need to operate. It is essential that operational commanders understand the political aims of both sides, and carefully position forces and develop rules of engagement (ROE) to support U.S. political aims and most importantly, to avoid compromising U.S. diplomatic efforts. It is important that NATO military forces do not inadvertently provide the catalyst that allows Russia to escalate the conflict in accordance with its phased plan.
Should the conflict continue to develop, there is a strong likelihood of Russian special forces troops infiltrating across the border in a manner we are accustomed to seeing in a more conventional insurgency. These soldiers would be taking an advisory role in an effort to organize an opposition militia (Berzins notes an optimal 4:1 ratio of militia to special forces troops. 25 ) Depending on the political situation on the ground and ROE, NATO forces may or may not be able to engage these forces directly. If unable to challenge them directly, operational commanders must offer as much indirect assistance to the host nation as possible in the form of intelligence, ISR, logistics and advisors to ensure this threat is neutralized.
As the conflict develops, cyber warfare will likely become increasingly more essential as a war fighting means. Although theater commanders may not have direct control of the main cyber warfare effort, they should still make the best use of the organic cyber Assuming these measures are successful, U.S. and NATO commanders need to be prepared to transition to stabilization operations and turn control back over to civil authority.
We can expect that if we are able to blunt the Russian hybrid warfare attacks at any point on the spectrum, rather than quit they will likely retrograde back to phase one operations, returning to propaganda and strategic communications to reshape the battle space. If this happens, it is essential that NATO commanders assist the host nation forces in restoring stability and order as quickly as possible. General Gerasimov, in his article on Russian new methods of warfare, made clear that in today's world, war often has no beginning and no end in a traditional sense, but is always developing at some stage in the background. 27 Because of this view, NATO commanders need to be ready to continue the fight at a lower tempo, rather than declare victory and go home. This also means utilizing host nation forces to constructively engage with the civil populations to win the hearts and minds of the people.
Timeliness of response
A recurring theme throughout the discussion of countering hybrid warfare is timeliness of response. Success in a hybrid warfare scenario will likely be determined primarily by how quickly commanders can act to counter Russian aggression. In Eastern
Europe and the Baltics, the old adage that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure is more than relevant. The earlier commanders can act, the more likely they will succeed.
NATO commanders should focus on countering and defeating the non-lethal forms of aggression that will likely form the beginning stages of any conflict in the Baltics before the it morphs into full blown armed conflict. By countering Russian aggression while still in its non-lethal phases, conflict can be resolved before large scale destruction and loss of life occur. This means acting in defense of NATO member states well before the traditional lines of armed conflict are crossed, but this is much easier said than done. Article V of the NATO charter was designed to trigger a collective defense for armed attack of the territory of a member state, but that same article is ill equipped to respond to a modern hybrid warfare threat. Nadia Shadlow notes that, "Hybrid threats provide the "perfect" conundrum: the injection of so much uncertainty that NATO collapses under its own principle of allied consensus." 28
If Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania were to come under Russian attack at any point on the hybrid war spectrum, (Lithuanian president Dalia Grybauskaite believes her country is already being subjected to the early stages of "informational war, propaganda and cyberattack" 29 ) it is essential that these countries and their NATO allies are prepared to respond appropriately, proportionately, and most important, expediently. Unfortunately, many in the Baltics believe that NATO will use the ambiguity surrounding Article V as an excuse not to act, or defer action until it is too late and Russia has already delivered a fait accompli. 30 NATO commanders cannot allow this to happen. Doran and Grygiel hit on this concept when they wrote, "Deterring aggression against Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania is far easier than attempting to defend them in an actual firefight. But such a defense is probably a lot more feasible than having to reverse military occupation involving the type of aggression and annexation to which Crimea has been subject." 31
Counter argument
Some might argue that the use of COIN principles in early stage hybrid warfare is the wrong course of action to take and that NATO would be better served to adopt a policy of observation and inaction in order to avoid antagonizing Russia, which could lead to an escalation of conflict between Russia and NATO. From a historical perspective, U.S. and NATO leaders need to be cognizant of the many parallels that can be drawn between Russia today and Japan of 1941. In 1941, as Japan attempted to enlarge its regional sphere of influence, western democracies attempted to deter Japanese aggression and expansionism through strong sanctions and weak strategic deterrence. In a massive strategic blunder, instead of deterring Japanese aggression against China, these actions from the west forced the Japanese to seek essential raw materials in Southeast Asia, expansion that required attacking American forces in the Philippines and Hawaii, igniting the war in the Pacific. Although Russia is not nearly as isolated as Japan was in 1941, western meddling inside the traditional Russian sphere of influence, coupled with recent economic sanctions, may have unintended consequences and could cause an unforeseen escalation in the conflict. 34
33 Associated press. "Putin: Soviet collapse a 'genuine tragedy.'" 34 Charles Doran and Jakub Grygiel. "Sanctions may push Russia to challenge the current status-quo."
Conclusions
Although the risks of acting are real, the risks of not acting and leaving our NATO allies on the eastern flank to face Russian aggression alone are far greater. If NATO failed to defend one of its member states, the political fallout could potentially be disastrous. Not only would the credibility of the organization be brought into question, but it could fracture the alliance politically, leading to an eventual collapse. It would also likely encourage further Russian aggressions in the region, giving them a blank check to expand their influence in the near abroad.
In the Baltic states, the battlefield of the future is truly in the minds of the populations, and NATO must be prepared to contest Russian aggression in this domain. The people of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, as well as all Eastern European nations, need to see a unified western coalition that promises peace, stability and prosperity for their country, city and household. Russian phase one warfare will attempt to destroy that promise, and NATO commanders need to act swiftly and decisively, using the principles of COIN, to counter.
If NATO commanders and their staffs spend time understanding the Russian position and motives, and study the new Russian ideas of hybrid warfare, they can develop preplanned responses to the non-lethal phases of warfare that will serve to both mitigate risk and ensure responses are timely, proportionate and appropriate. Using well developed counterinsurgency tools is a great foundation from which to expand as commanders and their staffs work to counter Russia's new form of warfare. By understanding the operating environment, developing a western (COIN) narrative, supporting overarching political goals and securing the population, NATO forces can defeat and contain Russian aggression against our NATO allies in Eastern Europe, but only if commanders can take appropriate action at an
